We consider the problem of pricing n items to maximize revenue when faced with a series of unknown buyers with complex preferences, and show that a simple pricing scheme achieves surprisingly strong guarantees.
INTRODUCTION
Item pricing is one of the most fundamental problems in Economics, and to a large extent describes today's trading practices. From a theoretical perspective, the issue of market equilibrium prices has received enormous attention over the years. In this work we do not consider the equilibrium issues of market pricing, but rather concentrate on the basic problem of revenue maximization. We consider a single seller whose goal is to maximize his revenue, who must set prices on items before the arrival of a sequence of customers with complex, unknown preferences (e.g., think of a store or a yard sale). We prove that a simple posted single pricing scheme produces the best revenue guarantees known for this problem for two important classes of settings: buyers with general valuations for the case of items in unlimited supply, and buyers with subadditive valuations for the case of items in limited supply. Note that no good approximation is possible for general valuations with limited supply.
Formally, the problem we analyze is the following. We consider a single seller who has n items each in limited or unlimited supply. We assume there are m buyers with quasi-linear utilities who arrive in an arbitrary order and who have unknown and potentially highly complex valuations over subsets of these items. 1 We consider the revenue maximization objective-the goal of the seller is to make as much money as possible-and analyze a natural and ubiquitous setting in which the seller first posts prices on the items and then buyers enter one at a time and purchase whatever subset of the remaining items they want most. Since prices are fixed before buyers arrive, all upper bounds we present for our pricing scheme will also apply to the problem of designing truthful mechanisms with revenue guarantees in the setting of combinatorial auctions. Note that while much work on combinatorial auctions considers bundlepricing mechanisms (such as based on VCG), the vast majority of transactions in today's world are conducted via pricing on items, and thus it is important to understand what guarantees are possible in such a setting. As an upper bound on the revenue that the seller can hope to extract from the buyers we use the optimum social welfare, which is the maximum possible sum of buyers' valuations in any allocation. This is is the most revenue the seller could extract even if the seller could price each bundle differently for every buyer.
In the limited supply setting, we consider important classes of valuations functions which have previously been studied in the context of maximizing social welfare: submodular, XOS, and more generally, subadditive valuation functions [14, 24, 22, 12, 26, 10] . We show here that for buyers with subadditive valuation functions, a random single price achieves revenue within a 2 O( √ log n log log n)
factor of the maximum social welfare. We complement this result with a lower bound showing a sequence of subadditive (in fact, XOS) buyers for which any single price has approximation ratio 2 Ω(log 1/4 n) , thus showing that single prices cannot achieve a polylogarithmic ratio. Moreover, this lower bound holds even if the price is determined based on advance knowledge of the order and valuations of the buyers. The construction in this lower bound demonstrates a clear distinction in this setting between revenue maximization and social welfare maximization, for which [12, 10] show that a fixed price achieves a logarithmic approximation in the case of XOS [12] , and more generally subadditive [10] , customers. We also show that even if we assume buyers arrive in a random order, there exists a set of buyers for which a 2 Ω(log 1/4 n) lower bound still holds. Note that our 2 O( √ log n log log n) upper bound is the best approximation known for any item pricing scheme for subadditive buyers, even if assigning different prices to different items is allowed. We also show that for a special case we call simple submodular valuations (which generalizes unit-demand, additive, and submodular symmetric valuations [23] ), a random single price does in fact achieve revenue within a logarithmic factor of the optimum social welfare.
In the unlimited supply setting, we show that for buyers with general valuation functions, there exists a single price one can assign to all the items such that the retailer achieves revenue within a logarithmic factor of the total social welfare (and furthermore this holds in expectation if that price is chosen at random from an appropriate distribution). 2 Our main result in the unlimited supply setting (Theorem 9) turns out to provide a useful and convenient structural characterization needed for proving the desired approximation for subadditive valuations in the limited supply case.
Finally, we consider the multi-unit auctions setting [11, 23] where we have only one item and multiple copies of it, but buyers have arbitrarily complicated valuation functions over the number of copies received. We show that under the assumption that the optimal allocation gives at most a (1 − ǫ) fraction of the items to any one buyer, our single pricing scheme achieves a logarithmic approximation in this setting as well. Related work: Guruswami et al. [18] show that in an unlimited supply combinatorial auction, if customers are unit-demand or single-minded, 3 then a random single price achieves expected revenue within a logarithmic factor of the total social welfare. In this paper we show the restriction to single-minded or unit-demand valuations is not required: in particular, we show that a random single price achieves this guarantee for buyers with general valuation functions over bundles, which may not even necessarily be monotone. Moreover, no item pricing scheme (even one that assigns each item a different price) can do better, even for a single customer whose valuations are known to the seller. Our result for the unlimited supply case appears in an earlier version of this paper [4] . It was also discovered independently in a different context by Briest et al. [6] who study single price schemes in a network setting. In their setting, a buyer has certain subgraphs of the network it is interested in purchasing. A seller, who owns the network, first prices the edges and then the buyer purchases the cheapest subgraph it is interested in. They show that a single fixed price for all the edges guarantees the seller a revenue within logarithmic factor of the highest possible revenue.
As mentioned above, the setting we analyze can be viewed as an online version of combinatorial auctions. The literature on combinatorial auctions is extensive and spans the fields of Economics, Operations Research and Computer Science [8, 26] . In the Computer Science community, there have recently been two main threads of work: designing good algorithms [18, 1, 7, 2, 9, 20] and mechanisms [15, 16, 3, 19] for revenue maximization in the unlimited supply setting, 4 and designing algorithms [14, 23] and computationally efficient mechanisms [24, 22, 12, 26, 10] to optimize social welfare in the limited supply setting. For a detailed related work section see Appendix B, and for excellent recent overviews see [5, 26, 21, 19] .
In the context of social welfare maximization, work most related to ours is that of Dobzinski et al. [12, 10] , who show that in the limited supply setting, a fixed price achieves a logarithmic approximation in the case of XOS or subadditive [12, 10] customers. In our work we analyze its power for maximizing revenue. Structure of this paper: This paper is organized as follows. We start with terminology and formal definitions in Section 2. We then present our results for the limited-supply setting in Section 3: we show that for subadditive buyers, a random single price (with buyers arriving in an arbitrary order) achieves a ratio 2 O( √ log n log log n) , along with a 2 Ω(log 1/4 n) lower bound for any single-price scheme (even if buyers' valuations are known in advance and buyers arrive in a random order). We then analyze the unlimited supply setting in Section 4 and prove that a random single price achieves a logarithmic ratio for buyers with general valuation functions. We consider multi-unit auctions as well as a special case of submodular valuations in Section 5 and finish with a discussion in Section 6.
PRELIMINARIES
We consider the following setting. A single seller has a set J of n items, and there is a sequence B of m buyers or customers, who are interested in buying the items.
Each buyer i ∈ B has a private valuation vi(S) for each bundle S ⊆ J of items, which measures how much receiving bundle S would be worth to him. The utility of the buyer i ∈ B for purchasing the set T is ui(T ) = vi(T ) − P j∈T pj, where pj is the price of item j ∈ J. (For a single price p we have ui(T ) = vi(T )−|T |p.) That is, we assume that a buyer's utility is quasi-linear. Note that we implicitly assume that there are no externalities since the buyers' utilities are completely determined by the contain S. A unit-demand buyer is one who has separate values vj on each item j, and values any given set S at maxj∈S vj . 4 Note that the social welfare objective is trivial in this setting: one simply gives everything away for free. set of items purchased and the price paid; buyers do not care about the happiness of the other buyers, for instance. Finally, given the valuation functions of the buyers, we define Hi = max S (vi(S)) and H = max i,S
(vi(S)).
A buyer's valuation function might be quite complex since there are 2 n possible bundles, but we make the minimal (standard) assumption that given a vector p of item prices and a set of items J ′ ⊂ J, the customer can determine the subset T ⊂ J ′ it most wants at those prices. Formally, the buyer has a demand oracle [26] , such that DemandP rices(i, p, J ′ ) returns the set
We analyze important classes of valuation functions which have received substantial attention in the combinatorial auctions literature [14, 10, 12, 5] : submodular, XOS, and more generally, subadditive valuation functions. A valuation function v is submodular if
Between these two classes (submodular and subadditive) lies the class of "XOS" valuations. A valuation v is XOS if there are additive valuations {a1, ..., at} such that v(S) = max k a k (S), for all S ⊆ J. Submodular is strictly more restrictive than XOS which is strictly more restrictive than subadditive.
We study both the limited supply setting, where without loss of generality we may assume that exactly one copy of each item is available, and the unlimited setting where the number of copies of each item is as large as the number of buyers. It is assumed that each buyer wants at most one copy of each item.
The pricing scheme we analyze throughout most of this paper is a single posted price mechanism. The seller starts by choosing a single posted price p at random from an appropriate distribution. The buyers then arrive in an arbitrary order, and each buyer at his turn buys his most preferred set at the given price of p per item. (The order of buyers does not matter in the unlimited supply case.) The revenue of the seller is then the total number of items purchased times p. Clearly, since the posted price p is chosen independently of the buyers valuations, this scheme falls into the category of incentive-compatible mechanisms. In fact, there is no communication from the buyers, other than selecting the subset of items they will purchase. (Note that even if we allow buyers to purchase at multiple different times, since the price does not change, his best policy is to buy the set of items that he desires when he first arrives.)
In the limited supply setting, where one copy of each item is available, we say that an allocation T1, . . . , Tn is feasible if Ti ∩ Tj = ∅ for i = j. The social welfare of a feasible allocation T1, . . . , Tn is P i vi(Ti). The social optimum is the value of the allocation which maximizes the social welfare, which upper bounds the seller's revenue under any mechanism (even if the seller can have a different price for each bundle and buyer). In the unlimited supply setting the social optimum is P m i=1 Hi. Our bounds will compare the expected revenue of the seller to the social optimum.
For simplicity, we assume throughout the paper that we know H, and we remark on how to overcome exactly knowing H in Appendix A.
LIMITED SUPPLY: CUSTOMERS WITH SUBADDITIVE VALUATIONS
In this section we consider the case of buyers with subadditive valuations and analyze the single posted price mechanism RAN-DOM Single Price (Algorithm 1).
We start by proving our main upper bound for revenue maximization in the limited-supply setting, showing that RANDOM Sin-
(vi(S)), and s a parameter.
Step 1 Let q l = H 2 l−1 , for l ∈ {1, . . . , s}.
Step 2 Pick a posted price p uniformly at random in {q1, ..., qs};
Step 3 Buyers arrive in an arbitrary order and purchase their most preferred bundle. I.e., set R = J and do:
Procedure Generate Allocation (p) For buyer i, let Si = DemandP rice(i, p, R).
Allocate Si to buyer i and charge it p|Si|
Step 4 The seller has a remainder set of items R.
gle Price achieves a 2
O(
√ log n log log n) approximation to the social optimum, assuming the buyer's valuations are subadditive. We begin with a definition from [12] . DEFINITION 1. An allocation S = (S1, . . . , Sm) is supported at price p if, for each buyer i and for every possible bundle Wi ⊆ Si, it holds that vi(Wi) ≥ p|Wi|.
Before presenting the proof of our main result we first give two useful lemmas. The first lemma states that if the valuation functions are subadditive, then for every possible allocation it is possible to find a "contained" allocation and a price p that supports it such that if buyers purchased the supported allocation it would produce revenue comparable to the welfare of the original allocation. (This is based on a result we prove in the next section.) Unfortunately buyers left to their own devices might not purchase the supported allocation, however. The second lemma, though, states that if Generate Allocation is run at price p/2, then the allocation produced at least will have large social welfare, even if the revenue is not so high. . There exists a price p and subsets Li ⊆ Ti such that L1, . . . , Lm is an allocation supported at price p and furthermore
The proof follows from Theorem 9 (which will be presented in Section 4) and properties of subadditive valuation functions. In particular, we set Li = DemandP rice(i, p, Ti). The above lemma suggests that if the seller can present every buyer a different set Ti, then its revenue would be close to the social welfare of the Tis. (For a full proof see Appendix A.)
The following lemma states that we have a reasonable chance that the produced allocation has a high social value. The proof follows along the lines of [12] . For completeness, we include it in Appendix A. LEMMA 2. Let L1, . . . , Lm be an allocation supported at price p. Let S1, . . . , Sm be the allocation produced by Generate Allocation with the price parameter p/2. Then:
We now give our main upper bound for revenue maximization in limited-supply setting, showing that RANDOM Single Price achieves a 2 O( √ log n log log n) approximation to the social optimum, assuming the buyers' valuations are subadditive. The high level idea of the proof is the following. We first show that if we could limit the buyers to purchase only subsets of their assigned bundle in the social welfare-maximizing allocation, then we do achieve a logarithmic approximation using a random price p. However, the problem is that the buyers, when left to their own devices (i.e., when they are allowed to purchase any subset they want), given a price p might buy a totally different subset, hurting the utility of subsequent buyers. Here we might have two outcomes. The easy case is when the number of items sold is sufficiently large, in which case we are done. (Since we have a single price, the seller does not care which items are sold, only how many.) The more difficult case is when the number of items sold is fairly small. In this case we show that we must have a small subset of the items such that its social welfare is not too much less than the original. We then use the same argument recursively on this smaller subset, and the recursive argument has to be complete before we get to an empty set. . Let
be an allocation that maximizes the total social welfare. By Lemma 1 we know that there exists p1 and an allocation
m be the allocation produced by Generate Allocation when run with the price parameter p1/2. By Lemma 2 we know
If we additionally have
. We now repeat this process recursively on T 2 . In general, assume inductively that at iteration l of the argument we have allocation T l with |T l | ≤ β l−1 n and
be the allocation produced by Generate Allocation when run with the price parameter p l /2. From Lemma 2 we know
, and we have |T l+1 | ≤ β l n, maintaining the induction.
Consider β = 1 n ǫ . Then this process can continue for at most l = 1/ǫ rounds and thus our argument above implies that the profit of our algorithm is at least OPT /(n ǫ (8 log 2n
, we obtain the desired competitive ratio of
Note that in the argument above, the prices p0, . . . , p l are monotonically increasing. To better understand the argument and to motivate the lower bound given in Theorem 4 below, consider the following interesting example with just one customer, whose valuation function is defined as follows. Partition the n items into sets S0, S1, S2, ..., St where set Si has ni = ni−1/X items (so n = n0 + n0/X + . . . + n0/X t ; X ≫ 1 will be determined later). The valuation of our buyer is additive over items within any given set Si and then the maximum over the sets Si (so it is XOS). Assume that the value for each of the items in Si is vi = ((X + 1 + ǫ)/2) i , so the value of the i-th bundle nivi is approximately n/2
i . The set of highest value is S0, so suppose that as in the argument above, the seller chooses price p = v0/2. Then, however, the buyer will purchase S1 instead because n0(v0 − p) < n1(v1 − p), and then the seller makes a factor X less revenue. On the other hand, if the seller chooses price p = v1/2 then the same reasoning shows that the buyer will instead buy S2, and so on. This implies that if we limit ourselves to prices of the form pi = vi/2, as our argument does, the best single price is vt/2 which produces a revenue of only approximately n/2 t . For t = √ log n and X = 2 t = 2 √ log n we get a loss of Ω(2 √ log n ).
Note however that since m = 1, we know that there is a single price which is log n competitive -see Theorem 9; e.g. the price v1/4 would provide the desired ratio in this example. This example raises the question of whether an alternative analysis could yield a better upper bound. We prove below a surprising lower bound showing that even with just two buyers, due to the interaction between them, one cannot achieve a polylog(n) ratio by any single-price algorithm, even if the buyers' valuations are known in advance. This demonstrates a clear distinction between the goals of revenue and social welfare maximization in the limited supply, subadditive (or XOS) setting. . Our goal is to show that no single price can beat the ratio X. As we will see, it suffices to consider only two buyers. The construction is inspired by the example above, though it is a bit more intricate.
Let us partition the items into sets S0, S1, S2, ..., St where set Si has n/X i items and t = log X (n) = (log n) 3/4 (so, technically, the total number of items is slightly larger than n). The valuation of buyer 2 will be additive over items within any given set Si and then max over the bundles. Notice that this implies that at any given price, buyer 2 will purchase items from at most one set Si.
We will define buyer 2 so that v2(Si) = (1−1/ √ log n)v2(Si−1). The high level idea of the construction is that buyer 2's valuations contain almost all of the total social welfare (the auctioneer cannot hope to make sufficient revenue from buyer 1). However, when prices are such that buyer 2 would ordinarily purchase Si, and the price is high enough so that this constitutes substantial revenue, buyer 1 (who arrives first) purchases just enough of set Si, i < t to make buyer 2 choose Si+1 instead, reducing total revenue obtained from buyer 2 by a factor of X. In addition, the final set St has too low total valuation since
. Thus the auctioneer cannot possibly receive enough revenue by having buyer 2 purchase the final set. In order to make this work, we need for buyer 1 to be able to cause buyer 2 to switch to Si+1 by purchasing only a 1/X fraction of Si (if buyer 1 purchased more than this fraction of Si, then the auctioneer would make too much revenue from buyer 1). We do this by defining buyer 2's valuations as follows. Let S ′ i denote the first |Si|/X elements within Si and let Li = X
Putting these together we get:
. In particular, the key points of this construction are the following:
, and (c) |S ′ i | = |Si+1| = |Si|/X. In addition, buyer 2's valuations are such that at any given price, it prefers to purchase one of the sets Si in its entirety.
We will define buyer 1's valuations to be nonzero only over the sets S ′ 0 , S ′ 1 , . . . , S ′ t , and a max of sums just like buyer 2. The property we want from buyer 1 is that it should purchase S ′ i when the price is in the range [Li/X, 3Li/ √ log n] and furthermore it should never produce much revenue for the seller. The reason we care only about this range is that below the lower end, we do not care if buyer 2 purchases Si because the revenue to the auctioneer will be too low (less than v2(Si)/X). Above the upper end, we can show that buyer 2 prefers Si+1 − S ′ i+1 to Si so he will not purchase Si even if buyer 1 purchases S ′ i+1 . Specifically, the price at which buyer 2 is indifferent between sets Si and Si+1 − S ′ i+1 is the price p such that:
Solving, we have
which is at most 3Li/ √ log n for n ≥ 16. Moreover, we do not need to worry that buyer 2 might prefer just
since both sets have approximately the same size and yet items in S ′ i are much less valuable to buyer 2 than items in Si+1 − S ′ i+1 . It remains to precisely define buyer 1. To get the desired behavior for this buyer we set its value on each of the items in S
We can now check that buyer 1 has the desired purchasing behavior: he purchases S ′ i when prices are in the range [Li/X, 3Li/ √ log n], and yet he does not provide enough profit to the auctioneer. To see that this is true just notice that for all p = αLi, α ∈ [1/X, 3/ √ log n] we have
i . for all j = i. It's easy to see that this true always for j > i and it is also true when j < i for large enough n. Thus, buyer 1 causes buyer 2 to purchase a set with a factor X less revenue to the auctioneer than it would have purchased without the presence of buyer 1, at any price for which the auctioneer would have made substantial revenue. This shows that any single price results in revenue that is a factor X worse than the total social welfare.
Note:
It is easy to modify our example in Theorem 4 so that no buyer has a significant fraction of the social welfare. Specifically, we just need to make n "copies" of the example in Theorem 4, each on a completely disjoint set of items (so there are 2n buyers now, and O`n 2´i tems total), such that each buyer has valuation 0 for all items not from their own set. Then clearly all buyers have valuation close to the average.
Clearly, the lower bound in Theorem 4 depends on a specific adversarial ordering of the buyers. However, even if we assume buyers arrive in a random order, there exists a set of buyers for which a 2 Ω(log 1/4 n) bound still holds. Specifically:
THEOREM 5. There exists a set of buyers with XOS valuations, such that any single posted price (even chosen based on the buyers' valuations) produces an expected revenue at most (m/X + 1/m)OP T , even under a random ordering of the buyers, where
. Setting m = √ X we have a lower bound of 2
Proof Sketch: We use a construction similar to the one in Theorem 4, where instead of having only one buyer of type 1, we have m − 1 buyers of type 1. For each type-1 buyer j and each bundle S ′ i there is a special shadow-copy S ′ i,j that is only desired by this particular buyer and has value just ǫ less than the value of S ′ i . So, if there is a type 1 buyer before the type 2 buyer, then the first type-1 buyer who arrives will act just like in the one Theorem 4 -he will buy an identical bundle to the proof of Theorem 4 and will not take the shadow copy, since its value is a tiny bit smaller; all later type-1 bidders will prefer their own shadow copy to any of the original sets.
UNLIMITED SUPPLY: A LOGARITHMIC APPROXIMATION
In this section we prove a logarithmic bound for the unlimited supply case for buyers with general valuations (and we should also remark that the proof of the limited supply case builds on the proof here for a single buyer). By unlimited supply we mean that the seller is able to sell any number of units of each item, and they each have zero marginal cost to the seller. For simplicity, we assume that no buyer is interested in more than a single copy of an item, and therefore the valuation is still over subsets of J.
Unlike the previous section, in this section we make no assumption about the valuation function being subadditive. We do not even assume valuations are necessarily monotone (a monotone valuation is one such that for all S ⊆ T , we have vi(S) ≤ vi(T ), also called the free disposal property), so the maximum valuation for buyer i may occur at some S = J. The only assumptions we will make are that we are given the value H = maxi,S vi(S) (though we will relax this later) and that the empty set has zero value to all buyers, i.e. vi(∅) = 0.
We prove that a random single price achieves an O(log m + log n) approximation to the social optimum for buyers with general valuation functions. Recall, that such an approximation im-mediately implies an approximation for the maximum revenue the seller can extract from the buyers.
Before describing the argument, let us introduce some additional useful notation. We denote by ui,p the utility of buyer i when the single posted price is p, and by Si,p the set of items that maximizes its utility, i.e., Si,p = DemandP rices(i, p, J).
The following lemma states that by decreasing the single posted price, the seller never sells fewer items. (For a proof see appendix A.)
For clarity we start by presenting the case of a single buyer i ∈ {1, ..., n}. Recall that H = Hi = maxS vi(S) is the maximum valuation of buyer i. Clearly, the profit we can extract from buyer i is at most H. Recall that ui,p is the maximum utility the buyer can achieve for a single posted price p, i.e., ui,p = max S⊆J ui,p(S).
Let F(p) denote the number of items our buyer purchases under the fixed single price p. 5 We will analyze the demand curve which is defined as follows: the horizontal axis measures the "market price" p (the price we set on all of the items) and the vertical axis measures the number of items F(p) the buyer purchases at this price. Note that Lemma 6 implies that the function F(p) is monotonically non-increasing, as in Figure 1 .
Let p0 = 0 < p1 < ... < pL ≤ H be such that
, for all l; in other words, p0, ..., pL are all the relevant (transition) points on the demand curve. Let us denote by n l = F(p l ), for all l. (Note that since the number of items decreases with each p l , we have that L ≤ n.) We will prove next a fact which is essential to our analysis, namely that the maximum valuation H of our buyer (which is also the maximum revenue our seller can extract from the buyer) is exactly the area under the F− curve. Formally:
PROOF. When the price increases from p0 to p1 our buyer switches from buying n0 items to buying n1 items, and is exactly indifferent at price p1. Since ui,p j = vi(Si,p j ) − nj pj, this means we have ui,p 1 = ui,p 1 (Si,p 0 ) = ui,p 0 − n0 · (p1 − p0). In general, for every l > 1, since at price p l our buyer switches from purchasing n l−1 items to purchasing n l items (and is indifferent between the two sets), we have
So, summing all these up we obtain the desired result,
6 We can prove (see Appendix A) that for any s, the area under F is bounded above by
Let s = log (2n). Combining Lemma 7 and Lemma 8, we obtain:
Since q l ·F(q l ) represents the revenue obtained by the single posted price q l , this implies that there exists a single posted price p ∈ {q l |l ∈ {1, ..., s}} which gives an O(log n)-approximation for H. Inequality (1) also implies that RANDOM Single Price is 4 log (2n)-competitive with respect to the social optimum.
We can extend the analysis to multiple buyers in a direct way. The only point to notice is that we are given only H = maxi Hi = maxi,S vi(S) and not the individuals Hi = maxS vi(S). Thus we need to run RANDOM Single Price with s = ⌊log(2nm)⌋ and guarantee an approximation of O (log (n) + log (m)). Specifically, in Appendix A we prove, THEOREM 9. In the case of a single buyer (m = 1), the RAN-DOM Single Price Mechanism guarantees a 4 log (2n) approximation with respect to the social optimum. For any number of buyers m it guarantees O (log (n) + log (m))-approximation with respect to the social optimum.
Lower bound, single buyer, multiple prices: We now give a simple lower bound that holds for a general posted price algorithm that may have a different price for every item, even for the case of just one buyer. Consider a single buyer whose valuation for a set S is
. The seller has to set a price pj for each item j. Given his valuation functions, even though his total valuation is Ω(log n), the buyer will never spend more than 1. In particular, given the prices, the optimal strategy of the buyer is to sort the items in increasing price order, and then buy a prefix of size k such that each item will have a cost at most 1/k. Hence the revenue is at most 1. This establishes: THEOREM 10. There is a single submodular valuation function for which the revenue of any posted price mechanism has approximation ratio Ω(log n) with respect to the social optimum.
LIMITED SUPPLY: SPECIAL CASES
We now return to the case of limited supply and present two interesting classes of valuations for which a random single price does in fact achieve a logarithmic approximation.
Simple Submodular Valuations
We show here that if we have buyers with a subclass of submodular valuations that we call simple submodular valuations, then a random single price does achieve revenue within a logarithmic factor of the optimum social welfare. We say that v is simple submodular if it is submodular and if for all sets S, the last item x in the greedy ordering of S satisfies v(x | S − {x}) ≤ v(x | T ) for all T ∋ x such that |T | ≤ |S| − 1. Here, the "greedy ordering" is the ordering in which one first chooses the item x1 in S of highest individual valuation, then the item x2 in S of highest marginal valuation given x1 and so on. This class generalizes the unit-demand case (where for |S| ≥ 2 the last item x in the greedy ordering satisfies v(x|S − x) = 0) as well as the additive case and the submodular symmetric (multi-unit) setting [23] . Proof Sketch: Lehmann et al. [23] show that for submodular valuations, if one gives items to buyers in the order of maximum marginal valuation (i.e., at each step choose item x and buyer i to maximize vi(x|Si) where Si is the set of items already given to buyer i), then this greedy procedure produces an allocation with social welfare within a constant factor of optimal. Let us call this the LLN allocation.
Note that by submodularity, these marginal values are non-increasing. Imagine that we halt this process once the marginal valuations drop below p, and let F(p) denote the number of items allocated by that point. As in the proof of Theorem 9, the expected value of p · F(p) is within a logarithmic factor of the social welfare of the overall LLN allocation. Thus, it suffices to show that allowing buyers to enter in an arbitrary order and purchase at price p achieves revenue within a constant factor of p · F(p).
In particular, suppose that buyer j is assigned kj items of marginal valuation at least p in the LLN allocation. When buyer j arrives, the claim is that he will either purchase all remaining items in the second half of his assigned bundle or else purchase at least kj /2 items total. In particular, suppose not and let x be an unpurchased item in the second half, let T be items purchased, and let S 
The Multi-Unit Case
We consider here the multi-unit setting [11] , and we show how the ideas from the unlimited supply setting (Section 4) can be applied to get a logarithmic approximation in this case as well. The formal setting here is the following. Assume that we have only one item for sale, but n copies of it. We also have m customers, and each customer i has a valuation function vi : {1, . . . n} → R, where vi(q) encodes his value for obtaining q items, and these valuation functions can be arbitrarily complicated. The setting is essentially the symmetric valuations case in combinatorial auctions as described in Lehmann et al. [23] or in Vickery [27] ; note however that we are interested in general symmetric valuations, not only the submodular case.
We first point out that if we make no assumptions, then no single price can guarantee an o(n) approximation to the social welfare. In particular, suppose that the first customer has value 1 on any set of size 1, and the second customer has value n on the entire set of n items but value 0 on any other set. In this case, the maximum possible revenue is 1. However, note that this case is a bit peculiar because one buyer gets all the items in the optimal allocation. We show here that this is the only barrier to good revenue. In particular, we show that under the assumption that the optimal allocation gives at most a (1 − ǫ) fraction of the items to any one buyer, our single pricing scheme can achieve a logarithmic approximation in this setting as well. Specifically: THEOREM 12. For the case of n identical items, under the assumption that the optimal (or a near-optimal) allocation gives at most a (1−ǫ) fraction of the items to any one buyer, the RANDOM Single Price Mechanism guarantees an O`1 ǫ log (n) + log (m)´-approximation with respect to the social optimum.
Proof Sketch: Let ni be the number of items given to buyer i in the optimal allocation (the one maximizing social welfare), and let vi be the value of this set to buyer i (so vi = vi(ni)). By assumption, all ni ≤ (1 − ǫ)n. Now, for each buyer i, imagine drawing the monotone demand curve Fi(p) of number of items desired versus price, but where we cap the number of items at ni. That is, Fi(p) is the number of items buyer i would purchase in a store with ni items all at price p. So, Fi(0) ≤ ni and it eventually drops to 0. The integral of this function is exactly vi. If we sum up these curves, we get a global curve F = F1 + F2 + ... + Fm whose integral is the optimum social welfare. Now, let p be a price whose rectangle has large area p·F(p). The claim is that if bidders arrive in an arbitrary order, the seller makes at least an ǫ fraction of this amount ǫp · F(p) by pricing items at p. The reason is that by definition of F, when a buyer i arrives, he will purchase at least Fi(p) items if that many are available. Since the only way it is possible for this number of items to not be available is for at least ǫn to have been already sold, this means the total number of items purchased is at least min(F(p), ǫn) ≥ ǫF(p). This then implies the desired result.
We can also extend the above argument to the case that the seller has n copies of k distinct items, so long as the optimal allocation gives no buyer more than (1 − ǫ)n items total. THEOREM 13. For the case of n copies of k distinct items, under the assumption that the optimal allocation gives at most (1 − ǫ)n items to any one buyer, the RANDOM Single Price Mechanism guarantees an O`k ǫ (log (n) + log (m))´-approximation with respect to the social optimum.
Proof Sketch: The same argument as above applies, where ni is the total number of items given to buyer i in the optimal allocation. The difference is that F(p) could now be as large as nk, so min(F(p), ǫn) ≥ ǫF(p)/k.
CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN PROBLEMS
We show that single posted price mechanisms are surprisingly powerful, achieving revenue within a logarithmic factor of the total social welfare for unlimited supply settings for buyers with general valuation functions (not just single-minded or unit-demand) and achieving a 2 O( √ log n log log n) approximation for the limited supply case with subadditive buyers. These are the best revenue guarantees known for any item-pricing scheme, and in the unlimited supply setting match the best possible guarantee by any item pricing scheme.
We also provide a 2 Ω(log 1/4 n) lower bound on the revenue of any single posted price mechanism for subadditive buyers (even XOS buyers) in the limited supply setting, showing that even for buyers with known valuation functions, the gap still exists. Since social welfare does have a logarithmic approximation using a single price [12, 10] , this demonstrates a clear distinction between revenue maximization and social welfare maximization in the limited supply setting.
Note that our lower bound for limited supply does not apply if one allows the seller to use different prices on different items. An interesting open question is whether an improved upper bound is possible using multiple prices, or on the other hand whether an alternative lower bound can be given for that case. In particular, it is an open question if the lower bound can be extended even to the case where the seller is allowed to use just two prices. A second open question is whether our lower bound (which uses XOS buyers) can be extended to the more restricted class of submodular buyers, or whether alternatively a polylog(n) upper bound can be obtained in that case.
PROOF. Consider Li to be the subset of Ti that buyer i would purchase if he were in a store where everything is priced at p and he is only allowed to see the items in Ti. The fact that
vi(Ti) then follows from Theorem 9. The fact L1, . . . , Lm is an allocation supported at price p follows from properties of subadditive valuation functions. Specifically, consider an arbitrary subset Wi of Li. Since Li is the set that buyer i would purchase with items in Ti priced at p and items in J \ Ti removed, we know that
(If the above were not the case, the buyer would have purchased the set Li \ Wi instead of Li.) In addition, since vi is subadditive we also have:
Combining these together we get that vi(Wi) ≥ p · |Wi| as desired.
Lemma 2 Let L1, . . . , Lm be an allocation supported at price p. Let S1, . . . , Sm be the allocation produced by Generate Allocation when run with the price parameter p/2. Then:
PROOF. Define ALG(i, S1, .., Si−1) as the total valuation that our algorithm acquires from the set of bidders i, ..., m on the set of items J\(S1∪S2 . . .∪Si−1). Let OPTrev(i, L1, ..., Lm, S1, .., Si−1) be the total revenue obtained at price p/2 from the set of bidders i, ..., m if buyer j ≥ i would be allocated set Lj \ (S1 ∪ S2... ∪ Si−1). We clearly have ALG(i, S1, .., Si−1) = ALG(i + 1, S1, .., Si) + vi(Si) and also OPTrev(i, L1, ..., Lm, S1, .., Si−1)
≤ OPTrev(i + 1, L1, ..., Lm, S1, .., Si) + (p/2)|Li \ (S1 ∪ S2... ∪ Si−1)| + (p/2)|Si|.
The second inequality follows from the fact that we lose at most (p/2) |Li \ (S1 ∪ S2... ∪ Si−1)| from using up buyer i, and at most (p/2) |Si| from using up Si since Si might contain items that are in Lj \ (S1 ∪ S2... ∪ Si−1) for j > i. But |Li \ (S1 ∪ S2... ∪ Si−1)| (p/2) ≤ vi(Li \ (S1 ∪ S2... ∪ Si−1)) − |Li \ (S1 ∪ S2... ∪ Si−1)| (p/2) ≤ vi(Si) − (p/2)|Si|.
The first inequality follows from the fact that the allocation L1, . . . , Lm is supported at price p and the second one from the fact that buyer i prefers Si to the set Li \ (S1 ∪ S2... ∪ Si−1). So vi(Si) ≥ (p/2)|Si| + |Li \ (S1 ∪ S2... ∪ Si−1)| · (p/2), and therefore ALG(i, T1, ..., Tm, S1, .., Si−1) = ALG(i + 1, T1, ..., Tm, S1, .., Si) + vi(Si).
and OPTrev(i, T1, ..., Tm, S1, .., Si−1) ≤ OPTrev(i + 1, T1, ..., Tm, S1, .., Si−1) + vi(Si).
We also have OPTrev(1, L1, ..., Lm) = P m i=1 (p/2)|Li|, and all these imply:
(p/2)|Li|, as desired.
Lemma 6 Let p, p
′ ∈ R such that p > p ′ . Then, for every buyer i, |S i,p ′ | ≥ |Si,p|.
PROOF. Let us fix a buyer i. Assume that |Si,p| = k. By definition, since Si,p is a set of items that maximizes the buyer's utility under the pricing vector p = p1n, for all subsets T ⊆ J we have:
ui,p(Si,p) = vi (Si,p) − p · k ≥ ui,p(T ) = vi(T ) − p · |T |.
Assume now that p = p ′ +ǫ, ǫ > 0, and let T be an arbitrary subset of J with |T | = k ′ , k ′ < k. Then we clearly have:
Therefore, for all subsets T ⊆ J with |T | = k ′ , k ′ < k, we have:
This then implies that any set of items S i,p ′ that maximizes buyer's i utility under the pricing vector p ′ satisfies |S i,p ′ | ≥ |Si,p|, as desired.
Lemma 8
For any s ≥ 1,
PROOF. By Lemma 7 we have H = L−1 P l=0 n l · (p l+1 − p l ). Now we can bound the sum as follows,
Consider the prices that fall in the range [q l , q l−1 ), and assume they are pj ≤ · · · ≤ p j+k . Clearly we have that each price in the range is at most q l−1 . Since P j+k b=j (n b−1 −n b ) = nj−1 −n j+k ≤ F(q l ), we have,
as desired.
Theorem 9
In the case of a single buyer (m = 1), the RAN-DOM Single Price Mechanism guarantees a 4 log (2n) approximation with respect to the social optimum. For any number of buyers m it guarantees O (log (n) + log (m))-approximation with respect to the social optimum.
PROOF. For m = 1, the desired competitive ratio follows from (1) and from the fact that the expected profit of our mechanism is 
